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ABSTRACT 
 
7KLV DUWLFOH VHHNV WR FRQWULEXWH WR XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI 6RXWK .RUHD¶V DSSURDFh to marriage 
migration. Situating our analysis of marriage migration policy specifically within the recent 
emergence of a social investment approach to welfare, we bring together two bodies of 
literature that due to the methodological nationalism of much welfare state scholarship are 
usually treated separately. Through an examination of the policy framework governing 
marriage migration ± so-FDOOHG µPXOWLFXOWXUDO IDPLO\ SROLFLHV¶ - we find that successive 
Korean governments have actively sought female marriage migrants to perform various 
social reproductive roles as a means to secure the reproductive capacity of the nation, just as 
feminist scholars have argued the care work of citizen-mothers can be understood. Our 
analysis also suggests that marriage migration policy in Korea constitutes a distinctly 
transnational dimension to its overall social investment approach, which is strongly motivated 
by concerns to reproduce the next generation of human capital. 
 
Keywords: marriage migration, social investment, social reproduction, transnational 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Related in part to the country¶s economic outperformance in Asia, South Korea (hereafter 
Korea) has undergone a rapid transition from the mid-1990s to a migrant-receiving country 
(Castles, 2014). Growth in marriage migration, predominantly of female migrants, is a major 
DVSHFW RI .RUHD¶V PLJUDWLRQ WUDQVLWLRQ DQG LWV PLJUDWLRQ SROLF\ GHYHORSPHQW Castles and 
Miller, 2009). In contrast to Western states (Bonjour and Kraler, 2015), marriage migration 
has been regarded as a welcome migration stream in Korea; it has come to occupy a 
comparatively privileged position within Korea¶s overall migration regime and successive 
governments have actively engaged in managing marriage migration. Korea now has a 
comprehensive set of policies targeted specifically at marriage migrants and their families, 
spanning a range of policy fields that goes beyond migration to include education, social 
security and childcare.  
7KLV GHYHORSPHQW KDV FRLQFLGHG ZLWK .RUHD¶V WUDQsformation from one of the poorest 
countries in the world to a high-income welfare state with all major social programmes in 
place. For this reason, the Korean case has attracted attention from social policy researchers. 
So far, their portrayals of the Korean welfare (state) regime center largely on the 
µdevelopmental¶ or the µproductivist¶ welfare state. A recent body of scholarship, however, 
KLJKOLJKWV.RUHD¶VVKLIWWRZDUGVDµVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQW¶VWDWHPeng, 2011a, 2014; Lee and Baek, 
2014). The social investment paradigm constitutes a set of policies and ideas that emerged in 
the mid-1990s within national, transnational and international institutions across the globe as 
a response to fundamental changes in the labour markets and demographic structures of 
advanced industrialized societies, and their ensuing new social risks (Jenson, 2017). To 
address such challenges, the social investment perspective emphasises the ³imperative to 
reproduce - biologically and cognitively - human capital, therefore investing in having and 
raising children, and to be in employment as much as possible´ (Saraceno, 2015: 10).  
This article situates analysis of marriage migration within the social investment approach 
in order to contribute to understanGLQJVRI.RUHD¶VDSSURDFKWRPDUULDJHPLJUDWLRQERWKLWV
encouragement of it and the characteristics of the policy package it has developed around it. 
We argue that Korea¶s approach to marriage migration can be understood as part of its more 
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general concern to reproduce the population for human capital purposes within the context of 
demographic ageing, combined with a persistently low fertility rate. Our argument requires 
that we bring together two bodies of literature, the one on migration, the other on social 
investment, WKDW GXH WR WKH FRQWLQXLQJ µPHWKRGRORJLFDO QDWLRQDOLVP¶ RI PXFK ZHOIDUH VWDWH
scholarship (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002; Clarke, 2005), are usually treated separately. 
Thus, for example, while discussions of social investment in Western welfare states trace the 
origins of the ideas back to the highly influential writings of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal on 
solutions to Sweden¶s fertility crisis in the 1930s (Morel et al., 2012), they fail to mention 
that the Myrdals explicitly considered but rejected immigration as a solution to Sweden¶s 
µpopulation problem¶ due to fears that migrants would be difficult to assimilate (Jackson, 
2014). Such an elision of the migration dimension is symptomatic of the µcontainer-model¶ 
approach to the study of the social investment paradigmZKLFKµFRQWDLQV¶ analysis within the 
territorial and institutional boundaries of the nation state. Yet, our study suggests that 
marriage migration policy in Korea constitutes a distinctly transnational dimension to its 
overall social investment approach. More precisely, we argue that while analysis of the social 
investment paradigm is generally focused on the mobilizDWLRQRIµFLWL]HQV¶IRUKXPDQFDSLWDO
development purposes (see Esping-Andersen et al., 2002), consideration of the treatment of 
marriage migration in Korea reveals that its approach to social investment stretches beyond 
its own national borders and incorporates non-citizens too. This finding, we suggest, has the 
potential to inform understandings of the social investment approach to welfare beyond the 
specific case of Korea. 
The article first investigates Korea¶s evolution from a developmental state to a social 
investment welfare state, identifying the centrality of demographic concerns in Korea around 
population ageing and falling fertility rates. The article then turns to examine the scale, 
pattern and drivers of the growth in marriage migration in Korea from a demand perspective, 
which we argue are also bound up with Korea¶V µreproductive crisis¶. The article continues by 
analysing marriage migrant policies, demonstrating how those policies, framed within a 
social investment paradigm, are structured to ensure that marriage migrants contribute to 
stabilising families¶ social reproductive functions throughout the life course of families. 
Those functions comprise the production and reproduction of people as physical and social 
beings, incorporating on the one hand, family building through relationship formation and 
procreation, and on the other hand, the ongoing care required in the maintenance of people on 
a daily basis (Kofman and Raghuram, 2015; Kilkey and Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2016).  
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We argue that successive Korean governments, developing policies within a social 
investment framework, have actively sought female marriage migrants to perform those roles 
and have supported them to do so. In this way, we suggest, marriage migrants¶ social 
reproductive role can be understood as vital to the reproduction of the nation, just as feminist 
scholars have argued that the care work of µcitizen-mothers¶ can be understood (Yuval-Davis 
and Anthias (Eds), 1989; Yuval-Davis, 1996; Roseneil et al., 2013). Analysed from this 
perspective, marriage migrants¶ procreation and care for children as a new generation of 
future citizens serves to legitimize their comparatively privileged position as migrants within 
Korea¶s political and social citizenship regime. The article concludes by identifying what our 
analysis contributes to understandings of the approach to marriage migration in Korea, as 
well as to understandings of the social investment welfare state in Korea and potentially 
beyond.  
 
 
.25($¶6(92/87,2172 A SOCIAL INVESTMENT WELFARE 
STATE: PRODUCTIVE AND REPRODUCTIVE CHALLENGES 
 
The significance of the emergence in Korea of a social investment approach, strongly focused 
on addressing productive and reproductive concerns, is apparent when viewed in the context 
of the historical development of its welfare state. The early history of the Korean (welfare) 
state was characterized by its developmental aspects. From the 1960s the state¶s primary goal 
was economic growth, and while social policies emerged too, they were conceived as 
subordinate to economic policy and economic growth (White, 1988; Johnson, 1999; Gough, 
2004; Y-J Lee and Ku, 2007; Kim and Kim, 2008). Many social programmes were introduced 
in this period despite lower levels of socio-economic development than in European cases 
(Hort and Kuhnle, 2000), and despite the absence of strong leftist party politics or social 
movements (Aspalter, 2006). Social programmes, however, were carefully targeted and 
selectively implemented with a primary goal of securing the µproductive¶ labour force - male 
full-time workers (Peng, 2014) - while minimizing state provision for universal social welfare 
(Shin, 2000). Limited state welfare commitment necessitated a heavy reliance on the family 
and the market for welfare, including care. Thus, we may call Korea in this period merely µa 
developmental state¶ rather than µa developmental welfare state¶.  
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The developmental state of Korea was seriously challenged following the Asian 
economic crisis of 1997 (Kwon, 2007). The social security system proved too weak to 
successfully absorb impacts from the economic crisis and economic restructuring. Demand 
for fundamental welfare reforms was mounting internally, as well as from external 
international bodies such as the World Bank. In response, the crisis-period administration 
(1998-2003) formally adopted µproductive (or productivist) welfare¶ as a new paradigm 
(Holliday, 2000; Kuhnle, 2002). Under this approach, the status of social policy was elevated 
from a subordinate position to an indispensable partnership with economic policy (Office of 
the President, 1999), and a series of social programmes was either substantially reformed or 
newly adopted, leading to a rapid increase in government¶s social expenditure (Y-M Kim, 
2008). While the legacy of the developmental state was not completely phased out by the 
productive welfare regime (YH Kim, 2003; Kim and Kim, 2008), there was a marked shift in 
the dominant welfare rationale in Korea from a residual and reluctant stance to a more 
universal and positive one (Peng and Wong, 2008; Peng, 2009).  
The ideas and institutions of productive welfare of the Kim Dae-jung government (1998-
2003) were succeeded by the Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008). Continuing with 
the welfare expansion initiated by the previous administration, the Roh government staged 
µsocial investment¶ as a new welfare paradigm (Government-Civil Joint Taskforce, 2006). It 
should be noted that valuing social investment is not an entirely new element in Korean 
welfare state history. As Gough (2004) stresses, the focus of developmental and productivist 
social policy was social investment rather than social protection - the traditional focus of 
Western social policy. The social investment approach from the mid-2000s in Korea, however, 
became more explicit and developed some novel elements, reflecting shifting policy concerns. 
The government at that time faced multiple challenges: economic performance was below 
expectations, and poverty and income-inequality were increasing. Ageing and care also 
emerged as social concerns as a result of a falling total fertility rate (Peng, 2011a). In these 
contexts, social investment was presented as a comprehensive solution to save the economy, 
the welfare state, as well as the regime¶s political stability. Here the relationship between 
welfare and economy (development) was more positively framed than in the productive 
welfare regime: welfare not just assists economic development but it can also actively 
generate and sustain economic development. So, social policy was no longer subordinate to 
economic policy in Korea; rather, it began to be approached as an essential element for the 
QDWLRQ¶VVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFVXVWDLQDELOLW\ 
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A social investment approach as had been promoted in other countries from the 1990s, 
typically emphasizes human capital development and activation policies, and children and 
(economically inactive) women are primary considerations (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002; 
Jenson, 2012; Saraceno, 2015; Papadopoulos and Velázquez Leyer, 2016). Likewise, the Roh 
administration¶V social investment approach targeted children and women (or broadly 
µIDPLO\¶, in order to address social reproductive concerns linked to the social and economic 
implications of ageing and a shrinking population (Government-Civil Joint Taskforce, 2006; 
Government of Korea, 2010). The combination of a declining fertility rate and extended life 
expectancy has rapidly transformed Korea into one of the fastest ageing societies on the globe. 
According to the 2010 national census, the population aged 65 and over consists of 11 per 
cent of the total population of Korea. While that is not very high by OECD standards, the 
speed of increase in the over-65 population is remarkable: it was only 3 per cent in 1970 and 
increased to 7 per cent in 2000 (Statistics Korea, 2014a). What the Korean government 
problematizes is the extremely low fertility rate: the total fertility rate in Korea has dropped 
sharply since the 1970s, and has remained around 1.2 per cent after having hit its lowest level 
of 1.08 per cent in 2005 (Government of Korea, 2005: 17). Reversing the ageing trend by 
increasing the fertility rate has since become the utmost policy goal for successive Korean 
governments (Government of Korea, 2005, 2010). 
.RUHD¶VWUDQVLWLRQVIURPGHYHORSPHQWDOWRSURGXFWLYLVWWRVRFLDOLQYHVWPHQWZHOIDUHstate 
are not distinct regime changes and are surely path-dependent. The dominance of the concern 
for societal reproduction in policy making from the mid-2000s, however, marks a significant 
difference from the previous social investment approach under the developmental and 
productivist welfare paradigms, which focused almost exclusively on productive issues (Peng, 
2011a, 2014; Lee and Baek, 2014). The Korean governments, as in other leading economies 
in East Asia, have long been committed to human capital development by emphasizing the 
investment in education, healthcare and work-force training (Aspalter, 2006). However, the 
expansion of universal childcare and work-home reconciliation since the mid-2000s in Korea 
seem to be more directly related to the falling fertility rate and the concerns for its (potential) 
social and economic repercussions (Kim YM, 2007; Peng, 2011a). Deeply concerned with the 
µreproductive crisis¶ and its economic implications, the government developed mid- to long-
term policy roadmaps - the µBasic Plan for the Low fertility and Ageing Society¶ 
(Government of Korea, 2005, 2010). In this initiative, the importance of public support for 
marriage, maternity, childcare and work-home reconciliation has been stressed as effective 
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measures to increase the fertility rate (Government of Korea, 2010). Social investment in 
Korea now represents ³the latest justification for social policy´ for both the productive and 
reproductive capacity of the society, as in many Western welfare states (Deeming and Smyth, 
2015: 298). 
5HIOHFWLQJWKHSHUVLVWHQWµPHWKRGRORJLFDOQDWLRQDOLVP¶RIPXFKZHOIDUHVWDWHVFKRODUVKLS
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002; Clarke, 2005), analysis of the social investment paradigm 
in Korea and elsewhere is focused on the mobilization of the productive and reproductive 
SRWHQWLDOV RI µFLWL]HQV¶ VHH Esping-Andersen et al., 2002). As we now move on to argue, 
however, through the analysis of marriage migration and its policy architecture, it becomes 
apparent that the social investment approach in Korea stretches beyond its own national 
borders and incorporates non-citizens too.  
 
 
MARRIAGE MIGRATION GROWTH IN KOREA IN THE CONTEXT OF 
µ5(352'8&7,9(&5,6,6¶ 
 
In parallel with the development of the welfare state, Korea has transformed itself from a 
predominantly migrant-sending to a predominantly migrant-receiving country. Korea had 
remained virtually shut to international migrants until the 1970s. Confident, however, that 
economic development was on track, from the late 1970s the Korean government sought to 
attract human resources from abroad. Starting with investors, traders and engineers, small 
numbers of migrants from nearby Asian countries began to arrive from the 1980s, but with 
the introduction of non-skilled labour migration schemes from the 1990s, numbers began to 
increase significantly. While the scale of migration is still small by global comparison, the 
speed of growth has been dramatic, with the migration stock rising from less than 50,000 in 
1990 to almost 1.8 million in 2014 (KIS, 2015).  
Marriage migration - the entry of foreign spouses of Korean nationals - has been a major 
route, together with unskilled labour migration, to Korea. While the growth rate began to 
stabilize in 2010 due to tightened monitoring of international marriages, the stock of marriage 
migrants continues to increase: in 2014 they numbered more than 150,000 and accounted for 
8 per cent of the total migrant population (KIS, 2015). In contrast to most other routes of 
migration in Korea, which have been designed on the principle of the mobile circulation of 
labour, marriage migration is expected to, and usually does, lead to permanent settlement. 
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Thus, marriage migrants constituted 79 per cent of all naturalization cases in Korea in the 
period 2005 to 2013 (KIS, 2014a). Similar to unskilled labour migration to Korea, the 
majority of marriage migrants are from nearby Asian countries - China (41 per cent), Vietnam 
(26 per cent), Japan (8 per cent) and Philippines (7 per cent) (KIS, 2015). In contrast to 
labour migration, however, the marriage migration route, as elsewhere in Asia (Yamanaka 
and Piper, 2005), is highly feminized; about 85 per cent are women (KIS, 2015).  
The growth of marriage migrants in Korea has resulted from an increase in international 
marriages. International marriages first became noticeable from the early 1990s when ethnic 
Korean women from China were invited by rural Korean bachelors. The source of brides 
diversified with time, however, and by the 2000s brides were arriving from Central and 
Southeast Asia (J Kim et al., 2013; Torneo, 2016). Before the new millennium, international 
marriage was rare in Korea; in the context of an ethnically homogenous society, marrying a 
foreigner was highly stigmatized (H-K Lee, 2008). International marriages, however, have 
grown fast since 2000: they made up 4 per cent of all marriage cases in 2000 and had 
increased to 14 per cent by 2005, before gradually stabilising at around 9 per cent; over 7 out 
of 10 involve a Korean husband and a foreign wife (Statistics Korea, 2014b).  
This highly feminized migration route, from the demand-side, is related to the so-called 
µbachelor surplus¶ in Korea (J Kim et al, 2013). A skewed sex ratio caused by strong family 
planning policies from the 1950s to the 1980s led to a severe mismatch in the marriage 
market (Seol, 2006). Korea traditionally has had a strong preference for sons, and sex 
selection (in other words, sex-selective abortion) occurred in the context of discouragement 
of multiple child-bearing. The sex off-balance reached its highest in 1990 with a male to 
female ratio of 117:100. After three decades of tight family planning and selective birth, some 
males at their marriage age, especially those living in rural areas, found themselves with an 
insufficient supply of potential native brides (J Kim et al., 2014). The enhanced social and 
economic status of Korean women has also contributed to the mismatch (Park, 2011). Higher 
and extended education of women means increased career aspirations and delayed or given-
up marriages. Even those women considering marriage expect their male partners to have 
better educational backgrounds and occupational prospects. Where females have a wider 
choice than males, there is no reason for them to marry down the social and economic ladder. 
The marriage market in disadvantaged areas, especially in the country-side, was particularly 
squeezed, leaving some would-be bridegrooms virtually no option but to look overseas (H 
Lee, 2012). Exploiting this situation, international marriage businesses flourished and foreign 
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brides became a common sight from the early 2000s, at first in rural areas and later in cities 
as well. 
The development of transnational solutions to address personal or family level 
UHSURGXFWLYH QHHGV KDV EHHQ ZLGHO\ REVHUYHG E\ VFKRODUV WKURXJK WKH OHQV RI µJOREDO FDUH
FKDLQV¶+RFKVFKLOG3DUUHxDs, 2000), which some conceive as comprising, in addition 
to care, reproductive activities including sexual relationships (Kofman, 2012; Yeates, 2012). 
Clearly female marriage migrants have been sought for various care roles as wives, mothers 
and daughters-in-law for Korean men and their families (IOM, 2010), and this can be 
understood as another example of the growing international division in social reproductive 
labour linked to uneven patterns of globalization, which frequently result in highly 
exploitative conditions for female migrants (Parreñas, 2000). The distinct focus of this article, 
however, is the institutional dimensions of the phenomenon. In other words, our analysis 
aims to make sense of how Korean governments have instrumentalized marriage migrants 
and rationalized their policies in order to address the µreproductive crisis¶ by assisting them to 
become additional members of the society and replenish the population by bearing the next 
generation. We argue that the social investment approach to welfare in general in the context 
of reproductive crisis is key to understanding the policy formulation for marriage migrants 
and their families.  
 
 
MARRIAGE MIGRATION POLICIES AS SOCIAL INVESTMENT 
STRATEGIES 
 
It was some local governments, in an effort to address diminishing population levels, which 
began to actively engage in the international marriage process, for example, by subsidizing 
travel expenses and arranging marriage ceremonies for free (H-K Lee, 2008). Since the late 
2000s, however, the central government also has established policies targeting marriage 
migrants. A legal frame of marriage migration policies was developed through the enactment 
of the µMulticultural Families Support Act¶ in 2008. The purpose of the Act is ³to help 
multicultural family members enjoy a stable family life, and contribute to the improvement of 
their quality of life and integration into society´ (Article 1). µMulticultural families¶ are 
defined as families comprised of a lawful migrant (including those already naturalized), 
married to a Korean national, and their children. It is important to note that the term 
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µmulticultural¶ as used in Korean policy is neither a theoretically-grounded definition nor a 
direct reference to µmulticulturalism¶ or µmulticultural policy¶ as understood in the West (Y-s 
Lee, 2011; M Kim, 2013). Rather, the expression µmulticultural people¶ was introduced as an 
alternative to the then prevalent expressions of µmixed race¶ or µforeign blood¶, which have 
derogative and exclusionary connotations.  
We should note that marriage migration policies are framed as family policies as much as 
(im)migration policies in Korea (H-K Lee, 2008). Marriage migrants, therefore, represent a 
rather atypical position in Korea where anti-settlement is the prevailing goal of migration 
policy (Seol and Skrentny, 2009). Unlike most other types of migrant, marriage migrants are 
supposed (and encouraged) to settle permanently, and they are the recipients of a targeted 
programme of social support to achieve this. That is the rationale resulting in marriage 
migration policy intersecting with other policy areas, notably social security, care and 
education. Unsurprisingly, the family-policy related ministry, currently The Ministry of 
Gender Equality and the Family, takes the lead role in formulating and implementing the 
policy package known as µThe Basic Plan for Multicultural Family Policy¶, of which the first 
plan ran 2010 to 2012 and the second 2013 to 2017. Among others, the fast and complete 
DGDSWDWLRQDQGLQWHJUDWLRQRIPDUULDJHPLJUDQWVDQGWKHLUFKLOGUHQµDVDIDPLO\¶ is a primary 
goal of these plans (MOGEF, 2012).1 This is because their failure in adaptation and 
integration potentially jeopardizes the entire process of production and reproduction of the 
Korean family, which, we maintain, is a key policy concern for the Korean social investment 
welfare state. 
Although not explicit in the law, µmulticultural family policies¶ target a certain type of 
marriage migration: female migrants married to Korean men (by birth) (Seol et al., 2009). As 
a consequence, other types of marriage migration, such as foreign husbands or marriages 
between migrants, are largely irrelevant to the policies. From the outset, µmulticultural family 
policy¶ was designed to support female marriage migrants and their families through their life 
course (see MOHW, 2008). As Table 1 outlines, the life course comprises all stages of family 
life which a typical (female) marriage migrant might go through: from marriage preparation, 
the formation of a family, the expansion of a family through child bearing and rearing, to 
potentially marital breakdown. A range of policies are specified for each stage to assist 
marriage migrants perform various social reproductive roles following the life course of 
married women in the family. This section continues by investigating how government 
policies intervene in this process both within the nation state and by acting transnationally, 
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and why this particular form of migration-social policy nexus has emerged as part of the 
Korean social-investment welfare state. 
 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
 
Assisting bride recruitment and family formation 
 
The Korean government assists its citizens in finding wives, forming families and 
maintaining marital relationships. As argued above, the rapid increase in marriage migration 
in Korea is related to the phenomenon of µbachelor surplus¶ resulting in some men having had 
difficulty finding a marriage partner and forming a family. Failure to marry in Korea is 
traditionally seen as a personal and family crisis of reproduction, so it is problematized and 
stigmatized, although these attitudes are changing. It is also perceived as a public problem, 
however, as delay and decline in marriage can lead to failure to reproduce the next generation 
and translates into sub-replacement fertility levels. The Korean government, therefore, has 
been concerned to address this µreproductive crisis¶, and admitting more (female) marriage 
migrants has been explicitly discussed as one solution to guarantee the demographic 
sustainability of the country. Thus, the government asserted that growth in multicultural 
families can curb the low-fertility and the ageing trend in Korea, especially in rural areas, by 
increasing the fertility rate (MOHW, 2008).  
Much policy effort has been made to maintain and streamline the supply of marriage 
migrants. In the early 2000s when the marriage migration industry first emerged in Korea 
unfettered by government regulation, there were reports of widespread abuse against migrant 
women, including human rights violations and deceived or forced marriages (Seol et al., 
2005). As a consequence, the governments of sending countries such as the Philippines and 
Cambodia, temporarily halted marriage migration to Korea or sought similar measures. 
Facing this crisis in µbride outsourcing¶, the Korean government began to regulate the 
industry, and in an effort to appease concerns it dispatched government officials (called 
µinternational marriage migration officers¶) to the major sending countries to share 
information with their governments and to help coordinate the export of marriage migrants to 
Korea. 
 
Assisting integration and family stability 
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Once marriage migrants arrive in Korea and the legitimacy of the marriage is confirmed, they 
are encouraged to attend a social integration programme and are given various incentives to 
do so. For example, if they successfully complete the programme, they are exempted from 
presenting a language proficiency test score when applying for a change from a marriage 
migration visa to a permanent residence visa, and a more simplified procedure is applied to 
them when they apply for citizenship. In sum, the Korean government has amended the 
nationality law in favour of marriage migrants (H-K Lee, 2008). Compared to other types of 
migrants, marriage migrants can obtain citizenship more easily: they have a much shorter 
waiting period (two years rather than five) before they are eligible to claim citizenship, and 
those with a child are exempted from the written component of the citizenship test.  
Ensuring the stability of families formed through marriage migration is the next key 
objective of Korea¶s µmulticultural family policy¶. Sustained marital relations are regarded as 
a barometer of the successful integration of marriage migrants and a prerequisite for the 
continuing reproduction of members of the society. As the number of international marriages 
increased in the first decade of the 2000s, so did the divorce rate among such families: it 
peaked at ten per cent of all divorces in 2011. Although their rate of divorce was not 
disproportionately high compared to marriages between co-nationals, the government 
perceived that their divorces indicated the failure of µmulticultural families¶ (MOGEF, 2012). 
To address divorce among marriage migrant families a policy priority was placed on 
preventing so-FDOOHG µfake marriages¶, since these are linked to spousal desertion (see H-K 
Lee, 2008; Freeman, 2011). International marriages became subject to a genuineness test 
prior to the granting of a marriage migrant visa or, further down the line, nationality, and 
marriage migrants are regularly monitored for continuing cohabitation with their Korean 
(male) spouse (IPC, 2012). These measures, combined with the introduction of an income 
threshold for marriage migration and accommodation and language proficiency conditions, 
have been introduced with the aims of increasing the likelihood of successful integration of 
marriage migrants and optimizing the conditions in which international marriage couples can 
start and maintain a family, with a view to ensuring their stability.2  
 
Assisting raising the next generation 
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The focus on marriage migrants themselves in the early stage of µmulticultural family policy¶ 
has been extended to their children (MOHW, 2008; IPC, 2012; MOGEF, 2012). This is 
because the number of children being born to Korea¶s µmulticultural families¶ has been 
rapidly increasing (about five fold over seven years). The children born between Korean 
citizens and marriage migrants are, of course, Korean citizens at birth; however, the Korean 
government has incorporated them into the special policy framework for marriage migrants 
as a result of development and education concerns. Consequently, those children are often 
WHUPHGDVµPDUULDJHPLJUDQWV¶FKLOGUHQ¶RUµFKLOGUHQRIPXOWLFXOWXUDOIDPLOLHV¶ERWKVRFLDOO\
and policy-wise. The age distribution of those children was initially quite young, but with 
time they are gradually reaching school age and adolescence. In line with the social 
investment paradigm¶s instrumental concern with children as ³citizen-workers of the future´ 
(Lister, 2003: 427), on the one hand, the government has been concerned that poor 
development of marriage migrants¶ children and their failure in school will be a significant 
burden to Korea in the future (MOGEF, 2012), and on the other hand, the government has 
valued these children as human resource for ³they have potential to be global leaders working 
for the country´ (MOHW, 2008: 1). Thus, supporting the mothers (families) of future citizen-
workers, and providing care and education for marriage migrants¶ children have received 
particular policy attention in the general immigration polices (IPC, 2008, 2012) and in 
µPXOWLFXOWXUDOIDPLO\SROLFLHV¶ (MOGEF, 2012).  
Social security for low income marriage migrant families was introduced in 2007 with 
eligibility dependent on motherhood (parenthood) rather than on citizenship. Marriage 
migrants and their children, therefore, are covered by the contributory health care service 
regardless of their citizenship status, and other social security benefits are provided to those 
who are pregnant or have dependent children even before they are granted citizenship 
(MOHW, 2008: 23-4). Since 2006, the government has been providing marriage migrant 
mothers (parents) with a temporary emergency cash support to assist with living, medical and 
accommodation costs in case of crisis (loss of, or separation from, the main breadwinner). In 
addition, since 2007 the government has protected marriage migrant families through the 
public assistance programme (Basic Livelihood Security), regardless of citizenship. Even 
when divorced, marriage migrants can benefit from those income supports as long as they are 
the primary care-givers for young children. Providing tax-funded income maintenance to 
migrants who are yet to be naturalized is an unprecedented move in the history of the Korean 
welfare state. These policies connecting the social rights of marriage migrants to their 
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motherhood (parenthood) status clearly demonstrate that the role of the (female) marriage 
migrant as mother (parent) is facilitated by the Korean government (M Kim, 2013).  
In addition, the Korean government is directly involved in the provision of care for 
marriage migrant children. Having investigated the care environment for the children of 
marriage migrants, it identified that the most common challenge µmulticultural families¶ 
encounter when raising children is the financial burden for children¶s care and education 
(Chun, 2013). In 2008 when the government began implementing its µmulticultural family 
policy¶, only 17 per cent of children in marriage migrant families, a third of the rate of all 
children, were enrolled in institutional childcare, and affordability issues were reportedly the 
main barrier to enrolment (MOHW, 2008: 29). The comparatively low childcare enrolment 
rate among the children of marriage migrants was perceived as problematic by the Korean 
government because it deprived these children of learning and socialization opportunities. To 
address this, in 2009 the government began to fully cover institutional childcare fees for 
marriage migrant families whose income level was lower than 70 per cent of the urban 
employees¶ average monthly income, regardless of their citizenship status. In 2010, the 
government decided to expand free institutional childcare to the entire µmulticultural family¶
population regardless of income level. Given that free institutional childcare was not yet 
available to the general population until 2012, it is surprising to see that the Korean 
government introduced free childcare provision - widely considered a hall mark of a social 
investment strategy (Jenson, 2012) ± first for the children of migrant mothers, and rather than 
for those of citizen mothers. Such policy prioritization for children allows us to understand 
why less policy effort has been directed at supporting PDUULDJHPLJUDQWV¶FDUHUROHVIRUDGXOW
family members (see Author, 2016). 
 
Assisting in becoming citizen-the-worker 
 
Concern with maximizing the life chances of the children of marriage migrants has also led to 
an emphasis in the µmulticultural family policy¶ package on getting marriage migrants into 
the labour market - becoming µcitizen-workers¶ - a further common feature of the social 
investment paradigm (Saraceno, 2015). Households consisting of marriage migrants are 
typically economically disadvantaged: almost 90 per cent of them earn less than the national 
average monthly income (Chun, 2013). In this context, marriage migrants¶ productive role as 
paid workers has come to be valued for its potential to raise household incomes and so 
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mitigate against the deleterious impact of poverty on children¶s development. While there is 
no attempt to facilitate crossing the boundary between labour migration and marriage 
migration, the Korean government supports migrant wives to ³extend their migrant 
reproductive labour from domestic spheres to labour markets´ (Lan, 2008: 1807).  
The general immiJUDWLRQ SROLF\ IUDPHZRUN µ%DVLF 3ODQ IRU ,PPLJUDWLRQ 3ROLF\¶ DQG
sub-policy framework targeting PDUULDJHPLJUDQWVµWKH%DVLFSODQIRU0XOWLFXOWXUDO)DPLO\
3ROLF\¶ KDYH equally HPSKDVLVHG µFDSDFLW\ HQKDQFHPHQW¶ RI PDUULDJH PLJUDQWV in order to 
strengthen their labour market integration (IPC, 2008, 2012; MOGEF, 2012). Accordingly, 
the government has introduced various programmes to assist marriage migrants¶ access the 
labour market, including education and training provisions designed to raise their human 
capital. Support is designed to be tailored to their particular situation - for example to help 
them utilize their foreign language skills, or to develop skills relevant to work in 
rural/agricultural areas. In addition, the government has developed an internship programme 
for marriage migrants, which provides financial incentives to companies hiring them. Part-
time job opportunities in the public sector have also been expanded, which alongside the 
universal free public childcare discussed above, is supposed to help marriage migrants 
reconcile the multiple roles of family care givers and paid workers. Through these measures 
the government intends not only to secure marriage migrants themselves as economically 
contributing citizens, but also to help them achieve the economic security to successfully 
raise the future citizen-workers (their children).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We have examined how social investment has emerged as a dominant policy paradigm in the 
Korean welfare state, complementing the previous developmental and productivist 
approaches. We argued that the µreproductive crisis¶ represented by the extremely low fertility 
rate has motivated this shift. From the mid-2000s, the social investment approach with a new 
HPSKDVLV RQ ZRPHQ¶V ZRUN-home reconciliation was articulated as a tool to address the 
µreproductive crisis¶ by reversing the demographic trend which the government feared would 
lead to the deterioration of the productive potential of Korean society. In emphasizing work-
home reconciliation policies, Korea¶s approach to social investment has much in common 
with the social investment strategies developed in Western and other East-Asian welfare 
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states (Peng, 2011b; Saraceno, 2015). New social risks are experienced in a comparable 
context among advanced economies both in East and West, and East Asian welfare states, 
which have long prioritized economic development began to see social investment strategies 
as pragmatic solutions to them with their possibility of win-win, i.e., achieving social goals 
such as poverty reduction, human capital development and replenishing the labour force with 
economic benefits such as job-creation (Yang, 2007; Peng, 2011a).  
Analysis of the social investment paradigm has been undertaken largely in line with the 
µFRQWDLQHU-PRGHO¶ RI WKH ZHOIDUH VWDWH ZLWK WKH IRFXV RQ SROLFLHV GLUHFWHG DW QDWLRQ-state 
insiders within the borders of the nation-state. Through a focus on marriage migration 
policies, however, we have demonstrated a distinctly transnational dimension to Korea's 
social investment strategy, with policies that extend beyond the nation-state and incorporate 
nation-state outsiders as both mothers of citizen-workers of the future and as citizens of the 
future themselves. By locating the growth in marriage migration and the development of 
marriage migration policies in the context of Korea¶s µreproductive crisis¶, particularly related 
to the so-FDOOHG µEDFKHORU VXUSOXV¶ we analysed how the Korean government has sought to 
DGGUHVV .RUHD¶V µreproductive crisis¶ at personal, family and national levels through the 
contributions of female marriage migrants. The Korean government has been promoting 
marriages with foreign brides and their migration to Korea, and has been providing marriage 
migrants with targeted policies with the aim that they settle and perform their expected social 
reproductive roles effectively. These targeted policies, µmulticultural family policies¶, are 
structured according to the life course of female marriage migrants in order to meet their 
specific needs at each stage. Especially for the recruitment stage, the Korean government 
often acts transnationally by dispatching officials and actively cooperating with the 
governments of sending countries.  
It also provides orientation, adaptation and integration programmes, and marriage 
migrants have a comparatively high level of social protection. As a family member, marriage 
migrants become Koreans¶ wives and mothers, and they themselves may become Koreans 
eventually. In this way, Korean society can secure much needed reproductive resources. 
While there are no policies explicitly aimed at encouraging marriage migrants to have 
children, there is targeted support for the biological and social reproduction of children. The 
childcare responsibilities of marriage migrants have been actively socialized, and it is 
remarkable to see that, at some point, care provision for the children of µmulticultural families¶ 
had been more generous than that for children in general. This situation provoked complaints 
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from Korean nationals and other migrant groups, and the government later acknowledged that 
policy resources had been unequally concentrated on supporting marriage migrants and their 
families, and that this had consequently provoked antipathy towards µPXOWLFXOWXUDO IDPLO\
SROLF\¶(IPC, 2012; MOGEF, 2012). What rationalizes and politically justifies these policies 
is Korea¶s adoption of the social investment approach, which has been motivated in large part 
by reproductive concerns. It is through the lens of social investment that we can also 
understand why the expected contribution of marriage migrants extends to the productive 
sphere too. In the context of widespread low incomes among marriage migrant households, 
migrant mothers¶ paid work is valued for its potential to increase the material well-being of 
their children, a prerequisite for maximising their future economic productive capacity 
(Esping-Andersen, 2002).  
7KH IRFXV RI WKLV DUWLFOH KDV EHHQ RQ PDNLQJ VHQVH RI .RUHD¶V SROLF\ DSSURDFK WR
marriage migration, rather than on critically evaluating the approach and its consequences. It 
is important to highlight, however, that some scholars have been critical of the social 
investment paradigm as played out in Western welfare regimes for its instrumentalization of 
ZRPHQ¶VUROHVDWWKHH[SHQVHRIZRPHQ¶VRZQZHOO-being concerns (Saraceno, 2015). Indeed, 
.RUHD¶VPXOWLcultural family policy package poses a number of risks for marriage migrants, 
particularly given the strong gender division of labour and power asymmetries within 
marriage in Korea. Future research should attend to the lived experiences of marriage 
migrants to understand more fully the vulnerabilities inherent LQ WKH .RUHDQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V
top-down instrumental approach to them (see NK Kim, 2009), examining for example, 
ZRPHQ¶VH[SHULHQFHVDVWKH\DZDLWFLWL]HQVKLSDQGLIWKH\GRQRWEHDUFKLOGUHQ or maintain a 
marital relationship. The identification of a transnational dimension to the social investment 
paradigm in the case of Korea also suggests a research agenda for those researching the social 
investment paradigm in other national contexts. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 While the Korean government expresses high expectations of marriage migrants¶ full social 
µintegration¶ (Y-J Lee et al., 2006; JK Kim, 2011), what µintegration¶ means is a matter of 
contention. Although respect for cultural diversity, anti-discrimination and harmonious co-
existence are manifested in the policy, many consider it as a form of assimilation policy 
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(Lim, 2010) or ³integration policy conditional on assimilation´ (S Kim, 2015: 63). This is 
because the key components of so-called µsupport policies¶ are oriented towards helping 
marriage migrants become quickly naturalized and fully compliant with Korean cultural and 
social norms, especially as family members, rather than towards maintaining their own 
ethnic and cultural identities. 
2 A key question yet to be researched is whether the policies introduced to support integration 
actually achieve their goal. Evidence from a number of European countries suggests that 
there is no direct and causal relationship between restrictive conditions of entry/stay for 
family migrants, such as language proficiency and minimum income thresholds, and their 
subsequent integration (Oliver, 2013). 
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